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JusTicES Black and Frankfurter sat together on the Supreme Court for a
quarter century. In that time, they were part, if not the leaders, of a revolu-
tionary change in judicial attitude that has given the Court a totally different
role in the political process than it had previously performed. That this change
was salutary, that the Court was right in giving up the task of sanctifying
property rights by erecting insurmountable constitutional barriers to shield
them from governmental encroachment, is now almost universally agreed.
There remains, however, intense disagreement as to what the shape of the
Court's new role should be. Staggering amounts of words have been written
on this topic in the past two decades, but they have only added fuel to the fire,
for the controversy continues to rage unabated. Two competing schools are
now dominant in this controversy-the activist school, which believes that the
Court should act positively to protect human liberties against repressive
actions of the majority, and the self-restraint school, which believes that the
Court should offer no more protection to individual liberties than to property
rights, but should defer to all rational decisions of the legislature on matters of
policy. Since Mr. Justice Black has become the champion of the activists and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, despite his retirement, is still considered the leading
apostle of restraint, it is altogether fitting and timely that Professor Mendelson
should present us with a book that highlights the "conflict in the Court" by
contrasting the judicial styles of these two Justices.
Professor Mendelson, unfortunately, is entirely unsuited for the task he has
chosen, for he is a partisan so deeply committed to the cause of judicial
restraint that he allows himself to treat the opinions and pronouncements of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter with uncritical enthusiasm and those of Mr. Justice
Black with ill-disguised contempt. If there was an occasion while he was sitting
on the Court that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position or opinion in a case was
in any way less than definitive, one would not know it from reading Professor
Mendelson's book. His statements are accepted without caveat or question, and
their rightness is considered proven by the mere fact of their appearance in his
opinions. Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, is under constant attack
throughout the book, and if the reader does not come away with the impres-
sion that he is always wrong, it is only because he has, on occasion, inexplicably
concurred silently in one of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions. Even then, how-
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ever, Professor Mendelson is careful to state or to imply that Mr. Justice Black
was undoubtedly right for the wrong reasons.
This approach to matters of public policy is perfectly natural and acceptable
in campaign literature, where no gradations between black and white are per-
missible, but it is most assuredly not acceptable in work that is purported to
be scholarship. The very existence of the conflict between Justices Black and
Frankfurter and between their adherents indicates that there are grave logical
and practical weaknesses in either position that render each unacceptable to
the other. The main weakness in Mr. Justice Black's position is reiterated
throughout the book-policy-making is a function of the legislature, and an
activist judiciary that substitutes policies of its own for those of the legislature
is negating the advantages of democracy. The principal weakness in Mr. justice
Frankfurter's position is only alluded to, and then is dismissed as being im-
portant only to those, like Mr. Justice Black, who think with their "hearts"
and who are not "coldly cerebral." The weakness is, of course, that legislatures
are demonstrably unreceptive to the claims of unpopular or disadvantaged
minorities, so that, if protection of the rights of minority groups is considered
to be.a requirement of democracy, this protection must be supplied by the
judiciary.
Despite his partisanship, however, Professor Mendelson has done much in
this small book that is extremely commendable. He has carefully gone through
the United States Reports from Volume 302, when Mr. Justice Black made his
appearance (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's first volume is 306), through Volume
359, which was the latest citation I found. He has culled out a large number of
cases that provide a contrast between the approaches of his two protagonists
and has broken them down into meaningful categories that permit ready com-
parison of their work over the various subject areas with which the Court is
principally concerned. In some areas, he has compiled statistics that are quite
damaging to Mr. Justice Black's cause. He found, for example, that in fifty-
nine cases dealing with the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
from 1941 through 1959, Mr. Justice Black cast a "pro-labor" vote in all but
four, and these exceptions were in unanimous decisions on simple questions.1
In more than sixty cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, accord-
ing to Mendelson's figures, with onlr one exception "it does not appear that
Justices Black or Douglas ever voted against a workman." 2 Or: "In ten years
(1949-59) the Court reached decision on Sherman Act 'monopoly' issues in
nineteen clashes (direct or indirect) between business and consumer interests.
Only Mr. Justice Black found a violation of the law in every instance."a Final-
ly, Mendelson observes that from 1941 to 1945, when the National Labor
Relations Board was a "liberal" body and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion was not, "Mr. Justice Black voted to sustain the NLRB in twenty out of







It ought also to be noted, however, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself
failed to live up to Professor Mendelson's description of him as a staunch,
hard-headed defender of such principles as stare decisis and deference to the
will of the legislature and the expertise of the administrative agency.6 He may
have defended these principles in the dramatic cases involving civil liberties and
on the economic questions that exorcise Mr. Justice Black, but where the ques-
tion was one on which he had a strong personal predisposition against such
deference, he was not unwilling to write his own conception of wisdom into
the terms of a statute, stare decisis and legislative intent to the contrary not-
withstanding. I have recently had occasion to analyze at some length two of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissents in cases involving federal interference with
state responsibilities in the administration of justice, a practice which he plain-
ly abhors.6 In these two dissents, in Screws 'v. United States 7 and Monroe v.
Pape,8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued for the reversal of the interpretation
given in United States v. Classic 9 to the phrase "under color of... law" which
appears in two unrepealed remnants of the Civil Rights Acts of the Recon-
struction era. The Classic interpretation permits the Department of Justice to
prosecute for civil-rights violations of state officials who, while on duty, commit
acts, such as murder, that are illegal under state law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who concurred in Classic, apparently not recognizing the potential effect of the
interpretation, quickly sought to reverse this ruling despite the operation of the
rule of stare decisis and despite the difficulty involved in showing that the intent
of the Reconstruction Congresses was not correctly interpreted in the Classic
decision. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's mind, the States must remain fully re-
sponsible for prosecuting their own criminals, and if Congress, as in the Civil
Rights Acts, should enact dearly constitutional provisions tending to relieve
the States of this responsibility in any way, he was not above construing these
provisions to meet his own notions of wisdom in this area, irrespective of con-
gressional intent.
The disturbing assumption that carries through the whole of Professor
Mendelson's book is that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions were always cor-
rect beyond question. Only once can one find any hint that an opinion of his
was the target of professional criticism, and then Mendelson offers a lengthy
5. For example, Professor C. Herman Pritchett, who has done much of the pioneer-
ing work in the area of judicial behavior, has noted with regard to decisions dealing with
administrative agencies during the 1940's that "both wings of the Court have been willing
to reverse the I.C.C. when its policies were 'wrong,' and have adjusted their arguments
accordingly," and has observed in "the curious capacity of the S.E.C. to make Frankfurter
forget his principles" a marked similarity between Mr. Justice Black's attitude toward the
ICC and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's toward the SEC in that period. PmuTcum'r, Tim Rooss-
vELT CoURT 180, 195 (1948).
6. Alfange, "Under Color of Law": ClaSsic and Screws Reditcd, 47 CoraTE. LQ.
395 (1962).
7. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). This dissent was unsigned and was filed by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter together with Justices Roberts and Jackson, 325 U.S. 138.
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
9. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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three-page defense of it.'0 The case involved was United States v. Hutcheson,1
in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, expanded the pro-
hibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act against the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes to prohibit also prosecutions under the Sherman Act for con-
ducting secondary boycotts. In view of the events leading to the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, its expansion in this manner appears warranted, and
both Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion and Mendelson's defense of it are high-
ly persuasive.' 2 The point is, however, that nowhere in the book is any similar
defense offered for one of Mr. Justice Black's opinions that superficially may
be equally incorrect. Since Mendelson suggests no criteria whatever for the
proper exercise of activism except to offer ad hoc apologias for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's excursions into the area of judicial legislation, his analysis may,
in the simplest terms, be reduced to this: activism is reprehensible unless Mr.
Justice Frankfurter is involved, but then it is praiseworthy.
Activism, however, is neither entirely reprehensible nor entirely praise-
worthy. Professor Mendelson's statistics, cited earlier, strongly suggest that
Mr. Justice Black's activism is "result oriented," in that his opinions seem to
be shaped more by the nature of the parties involved or the nature of the claims
raised than by "neutral principles" of law, and insofar as result orientation
determines a judge's position to the exclusion of other relevant factors, it
merits the deprecation it has received.' 3 Professor Mendelson declares that
Mr. Justice Black's opinions are aimed at achieving substantive justice, and
he recalls as "significant" Mr. Justice Holmes's supposed statement that his
job on the Supreme Court was not to do justice but to enforce the law. Mr.
Justice Black's voting record aside, however, one may wonder whether there
is not some interrelationship between "results," "principles," and "justice."
Critics of result orientation invariably speak of "immediate results"; they state
that neutral principles of law should not be distorted so that the immediate
result will be that a Negro will overcome one of the barriers of segregation or
that the advocate of an unpopular ideology will be freed from prison, no matter
how just their causes may seem. At this point it is difficult to disagree with
the critics; justice does not require that Negroes and other disadvantaged
minorities always win in the courts. When one turns from immediate to
ultimate results, however, the importance of justice becomes overwhelming.
Legal systems can tolerate occasional injustices that are necessitated by the
operation of neutral principles, but if these principles preserve an unjust order
in which justice becomes the exception rather than the rule, the legal system
itself is doomed. Judge Learned Hand recognized that the school segregation
decisions were inconsistent with a policy of restraint and frankly criticized
10. Pp. 33-36.
11. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
12. But cf. PnrrcHnr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 212-18.
13. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Conslitutional Law, 73 HAIMV




them on these grounds.14 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, realizing
the alternatives, chose to abandon self-restraint in these cases rather than
abandon the Negro to the mercy of the southern state legislatures. Neutral
principles of constitutional law, of course, are no less compatible with justice
than with injustice, and, consequently, are no less compatible with Brown v'.
Board of Education 15 than with Plessy v. Fcrguson.16 It mas thus clearly
within the province of the Court to replace the Plessy principle of "separate
but equal" with a more realistic and equally neutral interpretation of the equal
protection clause when the Brown case arose. Whether it did so successfully
or not is another question.
It is not at all unnatural that Professor Mendelson should complain that:
"Apologists for the modem version of activist Justice seem to concentrate
upon its First Amendment aspects and ignore its economic implications as in
the FELA, FLSA, ICC, NLRB, and Sherman Act cases."' 7 But surely this is
true not only because the current advocates of judicial activism are more con-
cerned with first amendment problems, but also because the case for activism
is far stronger in the first amendment and "equal protection" areas where the
Court would be invoking specific (although admittedly not self-interpreting)
constitutional provisions which were and are intended as limitations on Con-
gress and the state legislatures, and which prohibit them from doing "certain
things which they might at some point in time think it well to do."' 8 Even
Judge Hand agreed that the activists "have the better argument so far as con-
cerns Free Speech,"' 9 but he would still reject their position because of his
faith in the democratic process.
Congress is no more likely to concern itself with the civil liberties of an
accused Communist than southern state legislatures are to concern themselves
with the plight of the Negro.20 The democratic process serves the victim in
neither case, and the victims of Congress are not only hard-core Communists
but innocent people, who may have had but a fleeting connection with Com-
munism in the distant past, but who are nevertheless required to suffer such
penalties as the loss of Social Security benefits by an act that gives every
appearance of being a bill of attainder.2 1 The case for judicial activism in the
area of individual liberties is not negated by showing, as Professor Mendelson
attempts to do, that activism has grave defects when applied to cases dealing
with economic regulation. The parallel that Mendelson draws between Justices
Black and Sutherland 2__a vain endeavor to impute guilt by association-is
14. HAND, THE BIL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. P. 119.
18. BLAcK, THE PEoP.E AM THE CouRT 105 (1960).
19. HAND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 69.
20. See Shapiro, Judicial Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Position, 47 Con-
N= L.Q. 175 (1962).
21. See Flemxning v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
22. Pp. 118-24.
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thus not the coup de grace it was intended to be. Mr. Justice Black's activism,
whatever its merits or demerits, cannot be condemned by demonstrating the
weaknesses in Mr. Justice Sutherland's activism. It must be attacked in its
own right.
The choice between activism and restraint is not a choice between good and
evil, or right and wrong. Either may be fatal if taken in large doses to the
exclusion of tempering quantities of the other, and the choice between these
approaches requires a careful eclecticism together with a delicate and thought-
ful balancing of competing interests. Professor Mendelson is apparently con-
tent to define the only acceptable occasions for the exercise of activism as those
occasions in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw fit to employ it. That is rather
shallow analysis, and that is why his book is ultimately so dissatisfying.
Ironically, he has provided the ideal closing sentence for a review of his own
work. Speaking of activist doctrine, he declares: "There is more subtlety, more
depth, and more complexity in our culture than such one-sided polemics dream
of."123 There is, indeed. The "conflict in the Court" is one of great subtlety,
depth, and complexity, and is not adequately to be understood on the basis of
the one-sided polemic that Professor Mendelson has offered us.
DEAN ALFANGE, JR.t
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN CULTURE: Volume 2 of the four
volume RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961. Pp. 427.
Religious Perspectives in American Culture is meant for readers innocent
of sophistication in constitutional processes. It spreads thin ink over education,
theology, politics, sociology, statistics, history, economics, and law and over-
flows into the unrelated topics of religion in the arts: in fiction, novels, poetry,
music and in architecture. The mere range of these topics and the insignificant
portion devoted to legal analysis invite shallowness. But the main fault of this
book is that its shallowness is selective. It passes for an objective, authoritative
study, an oversimplified view of our constitutional history and church-state
relations. The doctrine of Separation of Church and State is thus criticized
without seriously considering either the majority view of the Supreme Court
or the views of some of the more extreme proponents of Separation. In the
end, the reader faces a city of one way streets. Discretion keeps one from ques-
tioning and delicacy prevents him from even guessing the reason for such
editorial policy.
Will Herberg's essay on "Religion and Education in America" argues for
federal aid to parochial schools and advances the proposition that "if the public
23. P. 127.
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